Critiquing Newt Gingrich’s Economic Policy

In the run-up to the coming battle for the right to run against Barack Obama — which begins, effectively, the day after Election Day 2010 — it’s worthwhile to examine the economic policy proposals of the potential candidates. First up is Newt Gingrich, simply because (unlike many of the other potential candidates) he’s laid out his own policy prescriptions several times. Gingrich’s plans currently consist of:

  1. A 50% reduction in SS and Medicare tax for both worker and company for two years
  2. 100% expensing for small business investment
  3. Matching China’s capital gains tax (0%)
  4. Matching the Irish on corporate tax rates (12.5%)
  5. Abolishing the estate tax permanently

    First things first: the payroll tax abatement is no good because it’s not permanent. If you’re going to do it, then you can’t sunset it after two years, otherwise you don’t change people’s behavior.

    I’ll consider the payroll tax reduction in terms of the Obama view of it, which is that it should apply to every dollar of income, not the first $106K or whatever it is. (That change by itself means that SS can’t refer to it as “insurance” anymore, rather than the transfer program it is, but that seems to have slipped by everyone.) Gingrich is talking about a 7.5% or so reduction in the base-rate tax on income. By the back of my envelope, I compute an effect of a little more than $100 bn/year. Not very much.

    What I’d prefer is a 100% abatement of ALL income and payroll taxes. This produces a stimulus of nearly 10% of GDP. You obviously can’t do that permanently. It would serve as a way to allow people to rebuild their personal balance sheets. Tax cuts are exactly like fiscal stimulus in that they put government money directly into the economy. I say that notwithstanding the standard objections because the Keynesian multiplier is phony in a balance-sheet recession like this; and also because fiscal stimulus programs have proven so hard for governments to do effectively.

    That said, the problem with getting tax cuts enacted is that they remove a lot of the political control from the process. With stimulus spending, you can make a lot of well-connected people happy by funding their priorities. But tax cuts fund the priorities of ordinary people, so you can’t buy the benefits of corruption with it. Democrats won’t stand for this willingly.

    And the problem with a broad tax cut like mine is that it gives proportionally more benefit to higher earners. The old “rich people don’t need a tax cut” problem. But as I showed above, the numbers don’t really work with any other approach. A small abatement in the payroll tax, especially a non-permanent one, just won’t do enough for aggregate demand to make a big dent in the employment picture.

    Full expensing is okay as emergency measure. It distorts accounting reality a little too much for me to like it on a permanent basis. The cap gains tax rate should probably be about 5%, although I can accept zero. A corporate tax rate of 12.5% would be heaven-sent, but only if combined with continued preferential treatment for personal dividends.

    The estate tax is an instrument of social rather than economic policy, and it’s exceedingly detrimental to the sustainment of a wealth-building society. I’m in favor of abolishing it, but not because this would fix the employment problem. It won’t.

    Where’s my most important tax reform? I want a zero tax rate on all retained earnings for companies up to a certain size, say $100mn/year in revenue, although that would have to be adjusted by industry sector and company type. I also want a zero capgains rate on realized value for start-up companies up to a certain size, but you’d get that with the zero capgains rate you already have.

    As I’ve been saying for several days now, the biggest problem we may be facing in terms of aggregate demand is the sudden lack of normal investment returns due to the ZIRP. If we try to address this with a sudden jump to a 2 or 2.5% policy interest rate, we could couple it with your radical tax-reform proposals in order to prevent a sudden deep recession. But you’d need a full income/payroll tax abatement for a couple of years to make it fly. Half of the payroll tax isn’t nearly enough.

    And it has to be recognized that a lot of the economic disorder now isn’t mechanical but psychological. Obama keeps saying that our problem is being protracted because it took eight years of Bush to create the problem in the first place. Does he mean it’ll take him eight years to fix it? This is obviously silly because other countries have already returned to strong growth while we continue to stagnate.

    The people are adjusting to a radically different set of expectations, including the prospect of permanently lower investment returns. We’re doing what economies do naturally in such circumstances: come very slowly back to some kind of normal. By creating huge uncertainty, Obama himself is protracting the weakness, so his analysis that Bush is to blame couldn’t be more wrong. People will need stable conditions for a long time (possibly years) before they start investing again. Expectations matter in macro policy.

    And of course, we’ve overlooked the huge pile of gorilla poop in the center of the room: the structural deficits due to healthcare spending over the next 20-30 years. A proper growth strategy would address this problem. With extensions as I’ve described, you have the beginnings of a growth strategy, so that’s hopeful.

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    The Troubles that Rich People Have

    Bruce Krasting is a former currency trader and is one of the people who have been deeply critical of Fed policy. He gives some interesting detail on how he’s had to forgo a lot of personal consumption because, with policy interest rates at zero, he’s not making any money on his investments.

    Don’t cry for him. He’ll be just fine. But you might shed a tear for the people who will lose out, like the automakers and tradespeople he won’t be buying anything from this year, or the charities he’s not going to support.

    This points out a very interesting limitation with current policy, that I’ve hinted at before. An economy that doesn’t generate reasonable returns on financial wealth can hardly be said to be wealthy in the first place. The flip side of all the underwater mortgages out there, and the federal support for extremely low mortgage rates, is that you can no longer buy agency MBS yielding 5, 5.5, 6 and 6.5 percent.

    What about moving out the yield curve? Well, the 30-year Treasury is yielding in the mid 3s. That’s not a buy for a long-term investor. Far too expensive. And then there’s the stock market, which has bubbled up with the bond market, and remains volatile and vulnerable.

    If there’s no premium to risk, then people won’t take risk. That’s the hidden cost of Bernanke’s zero rate policy.

    Administration supporters are in favor of sharply increased federal spending (and paying for it with much higher taxes). The political impediments to this in the current environment have been discussed more than enough. But keep in mind that ordinary people don’t hate spending. They hate wasteful spending. And there’s been no evidence that the federal stimulus spending is or will be well-designed or executed.

    I’ve hinted several times in recent weeks that I’d feel far better as a businessman and investor if policy interest rates were much closer to normal, say around 2%. But that’s simply not anywhere close to reality. It would counteract the very core of Bernanke and Geithner’s crisis-management strategy, which was to keep banks from having to mark their mortgage portfolios to market, and take crippling (or killing) capital losses. A 2% Fed-funds rate would flatten the yield curve and make it a lot harder for banks to repair their balance sheets.

    That’s why we’re in a box. A return to normal interest rates would be very healthy for a lot of reasons. It would bring back Bruce Krasting’s marginal consumption that is now lost because financial wealth is performing so poorly. This lost consumption may amount to as much as a few percent of GDP. But we can’t go there because of the impact on the banking system.

    A few weeks back, James Bullard of the St. Louis Fed published a survey paper which indicated that there is an unwanted secondary equilibrium when zero policy rates coincide with a near-zero or slightly negative inflation rate. The Taylor-rule curves are sticky in more than one place. The data show that this lower equilibrium is where Japan has been stuck for the past decade or more.

    And the research suggests that standard inflation-targeting policy tools are near useless in that zone. This squares with the observed ineffectiveness of current Fed policy.

    Frankly, I’d be willing to see what happens if we jump rates upward by a percent or two. There would be a lot of sound and fury, and quite possibly a renewal of the banking crisis of early 2009. (Boy, that would be a thrill for policymakers. They’d have to turn down their pacemakers a notch.) I don’t think the housing market would become much more disrupted, because so much current activity is refinance anyway.

    But we might finally start getting back to some real business and investment activity. If that happens, it would be a huge improvement on the current stasis.

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    Bernanke and Words that Speak Louder than Action

    Some people are saying that the reason the bond market collapsed Friday after Bernanke’s remarks in Jackson Hole, is that the market was expecting him to announce an expanded program of Treasury-debt purchases. He didn’t.

    Instead, he made some vague noise about doing whatever it would take to support the economy, come what may. But he also said that “there is no support” inside the Fed for increasing inflation targets. This cuts against Paul Krugman’s wet dream, which is to print a vast amount of new money.

    It also suggests that there won’t be a huge bid from the Fed for Treasury debt. Some of the money oozing out of the Treasury bubble yesterday found its way back to the stock market. But the overall message is “We have the tools to prevent disinflation, but don’t expect us to overdo it.”

    If you’re parsing Bernanke’s text, you may find it striking how often he refers to the importance of making credible statements. This is more interesting than it appears. If you read the most recent academic literature on monetary and macro policy (the “New Keynesianism”), it turns out that economists now believe that the credibility of central-bank statements and the transparency of their decision-making are key determinants in micro-economic outcomes. Okaaaaaaay…

    In other words, if you don’t think Bernanke is being upfront about how he picks the interest rate, you’re going to do things today that will make his actions ineffective or counterproductive in the future. It’s almost as if saying believable things is more important to them than what they actually do.

    Did You Enjoy Recovery Summer?

    In this week’s edition of Coffee and Markets, featuring The New Ledger’s Francis Cianfrocca, we’re talking about the Recovery Summer that wasn’t, Ben Bernanke’s remarks at Jackson Hole, and Steven Malanga’s views on the coming municipal bailout. We’re brought to you as always by BigGovernment.com and Stephen Clouse and Associates.

    Coffee and Markets

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    Related Links:

    TNL: How Obama Crushed the Recovery Summer
    Malanga: The Coming Muni Bailout
    WSJ: Bernanke on the Recovery
    TNL: Bill Gross and Mortgage Rates

    Bill Gross and Mortgage Rates

    You might think Bill Gross has gone for out-and-out socialism. He says that it’s impossible to go forward unless the Federal govt continues its current policy of originating and guaranteeing (through Fannie and Freddie) 95% or more of all mortgage issuance.

    That may sound silly, but think of the trenchant question he asks: what if Fannie/Freddie leave conservatorship and either become private entities, public entities with no public debt guarantee, or close their doors? What will it take for people just like him to step up and buy about $5 trillion worth of mortgage debt without a taxpayer guarantee?

    His answer? Between 300 and 400 basis points. That means retail mortgage rates would go from less than 5% today to between 8% and 9%. This makes perfect sense. It’s the cost of the risk associated with lending money to homeowners. Today, that risk is borne entirely by the taxpayers. (Evidence: Treasury is pumping about $20 billion dollars per quarter into Fannie and Freddie to make up their losses.)

    If mortgage rates rise to nearly 9%, the immediate effect will be a huge hit to the value of all outstanding mortgage securities. Many of those securities are now held by large and small banks who have been allowed to pretend that they’re worth more than they are, for capital-requirements purposes. If those portfolios get slugged again, it’s not going to be possible to keep making believe that the US banking system is solvent. You’d see a cascade of foreclosures in every region, and a collapse of prices in other financial assets, followed by another Great Depression. (This is precisely the scenario that yours truly was warning about in early 2009, that got solved by capital-requirement forbearance, aka “pretend and pray.”)

    And there’s more, because if you make mortgages far more expensive (never mind that this would simply be acknowledging reality), then housing prices would collapse too. Millions more people would suddenly be underwater on their mortgages and stuck in place.

    So for all ends and intents, we’re caught in a box. We can’t allow interest rates to rise to any kind of a rational level, unless the Fed is prepared to simply accept a $5 trillion asset class in repo at par. That means there are no normal policy tools, and no way to counteract the weak economy. I would bet money that there are people in the Fed who are now seriously debating the potential consequences of simply creating $5 trillion.

    Doing nothing is actually a plausible option if we’re willing to live with long-term stagnation and high unemployment. In fact, it might be the safest thing to do.

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    How Obama Crushes the Economy

    This Bloomberg report neatly confirms something I predicted a couple weeks ago. As interest rates fall, you expect prices for fixed-income assets to rise. (Because the coupon rate is fixed, so you’re getting a higher rate of interest than prevailing market.) But mortgage-linked instruments have a tendency to FALL in price as rates fall. That’s because of prepayment risk, which rises are people refinance at lower rates.

    Imagine a man preparing to refinance from 5.75% to 4.25%. Many thousands are considering such transactions right now. It’s a predictable effect of declining interest rates. For the homeowner it’s great, of course, but it means that whoever was receiving that 5.75% is now going to get the prepayment instead. The investor wanted the coupons to continue at 5.75% and he probably doesn’t really care to have the extra cash from the re-fi payment. What he has to do next is find something else to invest in, but if he goes for a mortgage, he’ll only get 4.25%. Our refinancing homeowner has created a little bit of deflation.

    By definition, deflation increases the real value of money income. It works beautifully for people with job security.

    It’s not a trivial effect that, in real terms, this environment is improving conditions for government employees at the expense of most everyone else — or at least, most everyone in the private sector.

    The people, who are generally as astute about inflation and deflation as they are clueless about the stock market, are strongly predicting deflationary conditions ahead. They’re doing this by stepping up the personal saving rate and paying down all kinds of debt. The mortgage refi is a classic example.

    They’re also deferring current consumption at a time when there’s more money floating around with no velocity than at any time in history. That’s a sure sign that the people expect deflation — i.e., even better consumption opportunities in the future.

    That means that when Obama comes out and tells us that he needs to raise our taxes in order to cut the deficit, he’s striking right at the heart of what the people want and need. Deflation increases the real value of income and savings, but taxation reduces your exposure to the positive effect of deflation. So Obama is crushing the economy with one hand, and taking away the (meager) upside with the other. The man is simply toxic. He’s as feckless as Hoover.

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    A Proposal for Paul Krugman

    I waded through all the straw men and the ad-hominem attacks in Paul Krugman’s latest piece so you won’t have to. Krugman is deeply opposed to extending the Bush tax cuts. He wants them all to expire on schedule, but I get the feeling he’d accept the Obama proposal, which is to keep the tax cuts for families making less than $250K/year.

    Krugman is an accomplished economist, which means he knows very well that the government has no real need for the $680 billion in tax revenue that he thinks extending the tax cuts will cost over the next ten years. The government can print all the money that it needs.

    What that means in turn is that Krugman’s real problem is with the fact that certain people earn high incomes in the first place. He’s always been very careful not to betray any ideological problem with this, at least not during the current debate. What he does say is that high-earning people have no need for a tax break because they already have all they need, and they won’t spend it anyway.


    Thus the doctrinaire Keynesian mind at work. Krugman is willing to sacrifice a great deal of what happens microeconomically (including the dynamics by which individuals choose their preferred mix of money holdings and consumption), in order to maximize current consumption and output. I know the theory: this is what is needed to ensure full employment. I also know that theory is no guide to a far less well-understood reality, something that economists fully invested in theory have much more trouble admitting than I do.

    Krugman goes on to postulate what I have to believe is a scare story intended to sell his views to the unwashed. He tells us that “the majority of the tax cuts” will go to the highest-earning individual out of every thousand, a person who earns an average of $7 million per year, but in no case less than $2 million. By artfully juxtaposing different units of measure, he also obscures the fact that we’re talking about less than $70 billion in annual tax revenue.

    So here’s what I’m willing to do for Paul Krugman. I’m one of the small businesspeople he says will derive no benefit from a continuation of the tax cuts, certainly not to the extent of being able to create more jobs. Since I’m faced with a reality that is completely at odds with Krugman’s superior knowledge, I’m happy to meet him halfway.

    Let’s preserve the tax cuts for everyone who makes less than $2 million/year in ordinary income. This is less than the Republican proposal of a continuation of the tax cuts for everybody, and more than the Obama proposal to eliminate the tax cuts at $250K.

    If we take Krugman at his word, he really wants to hurt only the top 0.1% of people, having convinced himself that they get the lion’s share of the benefit. For my part, I can tell you for sure that my proposal will make it easier for me to hire more guys.

    So it ought to be an easy negotiation. How about it, Dr. Krugman?

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    Why Not Protectionism?

    Not many people are saying so in polite company, but there’s a reason why all of the economists have been feverishly blogging for a good part of this year: the kneejerk paleo-Keynesianism which has driven macro policy since early 2009 has demonstrably failed to improve economic conditions and increase employment.

    The President and Vice President of the US, meanwhile, persist in their total ignorance of economics and insist on seeing this as merely a PR problem. To them, as to Hoover, prosperity will be just around the corner whenever another election is just around the corner.

    And the smart people with journalism degrees who presume to tell us what to think (and indeed are given credence by a shockingly large proportion of the people) can’t understand why the president gets no credit for his historic accomplishments. When people are worried about having a job, they won’t focus on much else. But that idea isn’t on the curriculum at Columbia Journalism School.

    The last time Keynesianism failed was in the Seventies. It turned out that people’s minds aren’t like mechanical engines that respond quickly and predictably to policy changes. The economic policy pursued by Kennedy and Johnson produced only inflation. Milton Friedman’s monetarism formed much of the basis of policy from the Eighties till now. This period has been called the Great Moderation, but from now on it’ll be called the precursor of the Great Recession.

    So economists have been struggling to find a new basis for policy. An awful lot of interesting work has been going on in the past 30 years to produce a “New Keynesianism” which responds to wage/price stickiness (an issue that Keynes himself had raised), and incorporates the stubborn fact that people’s expectations for future conditions actually change their current behavior.

    But it’s still all about the attempt to produce a set of equations that can provide uncontroversial determinants for economic policy. If we ever reach that promised land, it might be 100 years from now, or it might be never. The work will generate plenty of Nobel Prizes, but a Nobel Prize is only enough money to employ about ten people for a year. Not millions of people forever.

    At this point, economists basically have nothing. When the Democrats took power and needed to replace then-current monetarist dogma, they reached for the same theories that have failed in the Sixties and Seventies. And they’ve failed again. What’s next?

    I’ve made no secret of my preference: across the board tax cuts for businesses and individuals. We’re not going to see a recovery of consumer demand until personal balance sheets are in better shape and until job security returns. And we’re not going to see a business recovery until the returns justify the investments.

    But forget about that idea. It’s going nowhere because it requires a significant expansion of government debt, which no one wants. (Except for paleo-Keynesians like Paul Krugman. They want basically the same thing as I do, except they want government workers to get the benefits, rather than the private sector. I’m against that, not least because it’s just not fair.)

    What might we get instead? Trade protectionism. Stay with me for a moment, and recognize I’m not advocating this but rather projecting a possible future.

    America currently has no discernible inflation, and our industrial capacity is underutilized, at the same time that other nations are building capacity rapidly. Does it make any sense to erect trade barriers in the hope that Americans will pick up the slack and start manufacturing? Should “Made in America” make a comeback?

    If “Made in America” makes a comeback, so will “Look for the union label.” This idea is generally a stalking horse for a resurgence of labor unions, so it would thrill a lot of Democratic elected officials. This would take us back to the monetary regime of the Seventies, in which inflation pressure has to be controlled by a mixture of widespread layoffs and higher taxes. Everything will cost more (on a nominal basis), and the labor unions will ensure that wages rise to follow prices. But at least a lot more people will be working, which is the point.

    It also would put a great deal of pressure on business profitability (more broadly, on the returns to invested capital). Interest rates would rise sharply, making it more challenging for businesses to expand. Everything will cost more (on a REAL basis). This path would probably end up needing a lot of uneconomic government-directed projects: windmills, electric cars, and bridges to nowhere. If we want this to be sustainable, we’ll have to craft the right mix of financial incentives for capital to stay in the game, no easy task. But no one wants a permanent government-run economy.

    And finally, there are the classical reasons to avoid trade protectionism. Other countries will protect against us, making everything we receive in trade a lot more expensive. (And there’s your carbon tax, Tom Friedman. The price of oil will spontaneously rise very high.) Geopolitical tension will rise too, and Lord knows we all need more of that, don’t we?

    Still, this is a bold path we could try. Certainly the alternative of doing nothing while waiting for a few more economics Nobel Prizes to be awarded isn’t getting us out of the hole.

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    Joblessness, Urban Policy and the War on Work

    In this week’s edition of Coffee and Markets, featuring The New Ledger’s Francis Cianfrocca, we’re talking about the joblessness numbers, cities, Mike Rowe and the war on work. We’re brought to you as always by BigGovernment.com and Stephen Clouse and Associates.

    Coffee and Markets

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    You can subscribe to the podcast by following the links above, and if you’d like to email us, you can do so at coffee[at]newledger.com. We hope you enjoy the show.

    Related Links:

    TNL: The Baby Boomer Crisis
    City Journal: Free Marketeers Fight Back
    TNL: Jobless Claims: Obama’s Recovery Summer Proceeds Right on Schedule
    New Geography: City Thinking Stuck in the Nineties
    Mike Rowe: The War on Work
    TNL: The Bureaucrat Class

    The Bond Market and Homeownership

    So the bond market has been on a roaring rally as the economic outlook turns to dust, and midcurve interest rates have been falling like a rock. (Rates are a little higher this morning.) When interest rates fall in the summertime, a young man or woman’s fancy turns to thoughts of refinancing.

    And that’s the reason that prices for mortgage-backed securities have been falling, rather than rising. Mortgages in the US are the only kind of fixed-income asset that doesn’t hold its gains when rates fall, because of the prepayment option. Just when you’re settling in to enjoy that high coupon payment at a time of falling rates, poof! The homeowner hands you a bucket of cash which you now have to reinvest in a much tougher environment. Mortgages are screwy.

    HUD hosted a big conference yesterday on housing finance. You might be forgiven for hoping that the topic was how to de-nationalize this sector, but you’ll be disappointed. Instead, they looked for proposals on how to extend a permanent federal guarantee to most home mortgages, together with a requirement of “affordable housing” (read, “lax underwriting standards”), while simultaneously preventing housing bubbles. Not going to happen. You can have one or two, but not all three.

    If you go out of your way to make housing available to marginal buyers, you necessarily overprice housing because house prices respond to the cost of finance. It’s reminiscent of an interest rate swap: the actual price of the house is notional, not real. These are people who should be renting, not buying, and there shouldn’t be any stigma attached to that.

    I simply can’t understand why the government is so allergic to the idea of exposing mortgage investors to risk. The mere fact of a federal guarantee will structurally underprice mortgage loans. This sounds like a good idea, but like all mispricings it will cause a malinvestment of resources into housing. After what we’ve all just gone through, you’d think that the people running the show would avoid making the same mistakes all over again.

    Mortgages are difficult things to invest in, and not only because of the prepayment risk. But markets can figure out a way to put the right price on the risk. We should have global regulations to prevent the kind of abusive derivatives that fooled everyone into thinking that mortgage risk was “managed.” These instruments exacerbated the bubble and accelerated the crash.

    But even without regulations, it’s going to be hard for investment firms to recreate the CDO-squareds and the rest of the toxic waste. They hate losing money even more than they hate stricter regulations. That’s not the problem.

    The real problem is that people in government think they can do what the market failed to do, and systemically hide all the risk of mortgage investments behind a government guarantee.

    Yes, I know that Fannie and Freddie did this for many decades. But they always had very strict standards for so-called “conforming” loans. But when Congress changed the rules, even Fannie and Freddie got into the derivatives high-wire act. They became part of the problem.

    To restate, it’s not possible to expand mortgage credit to marginal or unqualified borrowers without increasing overall risk. And that risk has to go somewhere. The last housing bubble wiped out the banking system. The next one is being set up to wipe out taxpayers.

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    Does Paul Krugman Understand Social Security?

    When it comes to the ‘framing’ of public discourse on entitlements, Paul Krugman is accustomed to writing columns that are more about issuing commands than making arguments; he has railed in the past even against President Obama for admitting that yes, we do have a problem paying for the explosive present and future growth of entitlements. But even for this genre of “there is no crisis” column, his latest is a head-scratcher:

    Social Security’s attackers claim that they’re concerned about the program’s financial future. But their math doesn’t add up…

    About that math: Legally, Social Security has its own, dedicated funding, via the payroll tax (”FICA” on your pay statement). But it’s also part of the broader federal budget. This dual accounting means that there are two ways Social Security could face financial problems. First, that dedicated funding could prove inadequate, forcing the program either to cut benefits or to turn to Congress for aid. Second, Social Security costs could prove unsupportable for the federal budget as a whole.

    So far, so good; it is a fact that Social Security keeps an independent set of books, and also a fact that if it runs out of money from those books, it will turn to the general federal budget for assistance. Although his second point is just another way of restating the consequences of the first, i.e., what happens to the general federal budget when Social Security comes knocking for aid. As I’ll explain in a second, that’s not a hypothetical; because of the nature of the trust fund, it’s about to start happening.

    But neither of these potential problems is a clear and present danger. Social Security has been running surpluses for the last quarter-century, banking those surpluses in a special account, the so-called trust fund. The program won’t have to turn to Congress for help or cut benefits until or unless the trust fund is exhausted, which the program’s actuaries don’t expect to happen until 2037 – and there’s a significant chance, according to their estimates, that that day will never come.

    …So where do claims of crisis come from? To a large extent they rely on bad-faith accounting. In particular, they rely on an exercise in three-card monte in which the surpluses Social Security has been running for a quarter-century don’t count – because hey, the program doesn’t have any independent existence; it’s just part of the general federal budget – while future Social Security deficits are unacceptable – because hey, the program has to stand on its own.

    Actually, it’s Krugman who is trying to have it both ways here; I leave to the reader whether the Nobel Prize winning economist is actually this ignorant of basic finance or whether he is yet again attempting to deliberately mislead his readers. As Krugman himself notes, the program has run an operating surplus in the past, which is coming to an end. In the near future, Social Security begins running an operating deficit, which requires it to draw down its ’savings’ in the “trust fund.”

    But what are those savings? The problem, as I have explained previously, is that the trust fund’s only assets are IOUs from the federal government. If we stay for the moment with the fiction of treating Social Security as indeed an independent entity, that means that for years it’s been lending money to Congress that was used to prop up the budget at no real economic cost (it’s not like the federal government needed to lay out money to pay interest on those debts – all it did was make accounting notations). Whereas now, Social Security will begin asking for its money back – and all of a sudden Congress in one fell swoop both loses a cost-free source of funds and has to start laying out cash from the general budget to repay those debts so that Social Security can make payments to beneficiaries. That’s not “aid,” it’s precisely how the trust fund mechanism is designed to work. And it’s going to take a ferocious bite out of the budget. Saying this is not a problem for Congress is like saying your fortunes haven’t taken a turn for the worse when your interest-only mortgage suddenly starts requiring principal payments, or when you’ve been borrowing from a loan shark and spending the money for living expenses and suddenly have to start repaying him. Basically, Congress took the money and spent it, and now it has to tighten its belt to repay it. You’d go broke very quickly trying to follow Prof. Krugman’s financial advice.

    Krugman pooh-poohs the size of that bite, saying that “an aging population will eventually (over the course of the next 20 years) cause the cost of paying Social Security benefits to rise from its current 4.8 percent of G.D.P. to about 6 percent of G.D.P.” – which is another way of saying that it will increase 25% even if we buy his numbers (and bear in mind that while we can project trends on a general level, any projection that goes 20 years out is worthless – we can estimate what benefits we’ll owe based on demographics, but there’s no way to accurately predict GDP growth that far out) and even if we ignore the loss of a cost-free source of funds. Krugman’s reliance on speculation that the trust fund may never run out is just pure hot air, and his analysis overlooks half the problem. For some perspective, in Fiscal 2010, interest on the federal debt is 1.3% of GDP – if you assume that the cost of paying benefits rises by 1.2% of GDP and that’s all funded by Congress repaying its debts to the trust fund, all else being equal, you’ve doubled the cost of interest on debt. And this is before we even get into the question of whether we can grow payrolls as fast as we would like so as to avoid an even worse shortfall from FICA receipts.

    If you look at Social Security as just part of the federal budget, the whole trust fund accounting business reveals itself as an even more obvious sham. IOUs you write yourself are really an “I owe me.” A corporation that wrote itself IOUs backed only by its general credit and housed them in a special purpose vehicle with no other assets couldn’t legitimately count those IOUs as an asset – that is, to oversimplify, one of the things that got Enron in trouble. But Krugman seems to think the Enron model works just fine for Uncle Sam, who needn’t worry about his future expenses because he’s been saving up all of those IOUs…from himself.

    One way or another, Social Security’s operating deficit will be paid for not by any store of savings set aside for a rainy day, but by money that you and me and our kids and grandkids earn in the future. Don’t let Paul Krugman tell you otherwise.

    Follow Dan McLaughlin on Twitter.

    The Baby Boomer Crisis

    grill mondo

    Have you ever noticed that the baby boomers are not well-off financially compared to their parents? I don’t know if it’s an observation error, but basically all of the people I know in the older generation are doing at least reasonably well, and many of them seem to support their baby-boom children financially! Isn’t that weird?

    I think that on the whole, the boomers received some very bad advice and they acted on it. They were systematically encouraged to leverage up to buy the best educations and then the biggest houses they could afford, on the theory that these were sound investments. And then they formed the habit of funding consumption with borrowed money from revolvers and home equity. Doubtless the financial planners and the government cheerleaders who gave this advice thought they were acting in everyone’s best interest.

    But I think the net result is that, across their adult lives, the boomers have systematically overpaid for a great deal of what they buy. Whenever you use a financial product, you’re paying interest and/or fees to someone. And that someone becomes the beneficiary of compound interest, which if you’ve ever done the math, produces a lot of income almost by magic. When you’re a heavy user of credit, YOU are the source of the easy money that someone else is able to make.

    It makes all the sense in the world to use credit for the purpose it was invented for: to fund business investments and operations. That’s because you can easily measure the cost of credit in terms of the anticipated return on the investment or ongoing activity. If the numbers don’t work, you don’t borrow the money.

    But with individual finance, the “investment returns” are all intangible. There’s certainly a lot of psychic value to living most of your life in a large, beautiful house that you can convince yourself you own, just as there’s value to driving a nice car or having other nice things that you’d have to wait for if you had to buy them with money upfront. But there’s no easy way to see the overall drag that the interest payments impose on your power to consume.

    There’s got to be something important about the fact that, at least pre-crisis, the financial industry generated about 20% of the revenues of the S&P 500, but about 40% of its earnings. This industry is making way too much money. It’s like a parasitic tax, and I mean that literally. Just like government taxes, the finance tax puts you on the wrong side of the compound-interest equation, so you’re making less economic progress as time passes than you should.

    The boomer’s parents did pay mortgages on their houses, but the stricter lending standards and regulations of their day meant that, on a real economic basis, they were borrowing less than their children have been able to borrow. (They also lived more of their lives in relatively more modest houses than their children have.) That might explain why the older people are generally quite comfortable, while the boomers are scared out of their wits.

    If the boomers’ children and even younger people continue to do what they seem to be doing intuitively, which is to use considerably less leverage, they just might end up finding themselves in very good financial shape indeed. Let’s hope they get the math right and put the correct value on future security, relative to current consumption.

    Oh, and can the government totally screw this up? As always, the answer is: you bet your life they can! The easiest way to destroy the value of savings is to create inflation. And if two whole generations of young Americans are now choosing to sacrifice in the present in order to have a more secure future, only to see their elected representatives wipe their savings away, we just might get a revolution. That would be interesting theater.

    Follow Francis Cianfrocca on Twitter.

    - September 3, 2010 -

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