The revelation (or non-revelation, at least as far Western intelligence agencies are concerned) of a second Iranian nuclear facility near the city of Qom is of less significance to Israel than one might immediately imagine. If it is to have any impact at all, it is purely in the political realm, and even there it is unlikely to change the current state of strategic thinking in the IDF. While Prime Minister Netanyahu has, according to Haaretz, been lobbying American politicians with the question “If not now, when?” (for those not in the know, this is a famous quote from the ancient rabbinical text Pirkei Avot) and Foreign Minister Lieberman is insisting that the revelation constitutes proof that the Iranian nuclear program is military in nature; neither of these statements has the urgency they appear to display.

First, it is highly unlikely that a fact known to most major foreign intelligence agencies would be unknown to the Mossad or Israeli military intelligence. In other words, the Qom facility must have long since been factored in to Israel’s plans regarding a possible military strike on Iran’s nuclear program. Thus, the only game-changing aspect of the revelation would have to be political. In this regard, however, it seems to have had little impact. As Haaretz puts it, “U.S. President Barack Obama demanded that Iran come clean about its nuclear program or risk ’sanctions that bite,’ after the disclosure that a new plant was under construction southwest of Tehran.” The London Times reported, “Mr Obama and the two other leaders [Brown and Sarkozy] will today demand that Iran opens the doors of the secret site to IAEA inspectors.” In other words, the revelation may possibly lead to the possibility that new sanctions and/or inspections will be imposed on the Iranians, which is something the international community has been demanding for a long time, and will in no way eliminate the Iranian nuclear program itself, something which can only be accomplished by voluntary dismantlement or a military strike.

Second, and perhaps more important, the decision to strike or not to strike does not ultimately lie with Netanyahu or Leiberman, vocal as they may be. The man behind the curtain is Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who has carved an autonomous realm for himself in the Israeli government which is probably matched only by Moshe Dayan’s late-sixties domination of Israeli military strategy. This situation may be somewhat difficult for those unfamiliar with Israeli domestic politics to understand; but it mainly the result of two factor: the vicissitudes of Israeli coalition politics, and the rank incompetence of Barak’s predecessor.

Barak’s dominance over the military first emerged in the late stages of ex-prime minister Olmert’s term. With Olmert under indictment and clearly on the way out, the government was essentially run by an unofficial triumvirate consisting of Olmert, foreign minister Tzipi Livni, and Barak with the defense portfolio. Essentially, Livni and Barak operated autonomously and on an essentially equal level to the prime minister. While Livni had achieved this status as a result of her position as Olmert’s heir apparent in the ruling Kadima Party, Barak achieved his because of the military disaster that was the Second Lebanon War. The blame for the debacle fell mainly on Olmert and his defense minister, Amir Peretz. Peretz was a social justice advocate and union leader whose main concern was domestic economic issues. He was grossly unsuited for the role of defense minister and his incompetence became the object of public scorn and often ridicule following the inconclusive end to the Lebanon conflict. As Peretz’s successor, Barak inherited an army in shambles, with its ranks frustrated and disillusioned and public confidence in the IDF (usually very high) at an all-time low.

He has quietly and very successfully repaired the damage done. The leaks from high military officials ceased, the army undertook lengthy investigations and revisions of its operating doctrines, and began to display a competence and professionalism that had been sorely lacking under Peretz’s inept leadership. The sudden and unexpected attack on a suspected Syran nuclear facility, and then Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which despite the expected international condemnation many Israelis consider a necessary, justified, and successful operation, have both restored a great deal of public confidence in the IDF and earned Barak substantial political capital and influence. His political position has also been aided by the inconclusive results of the last Israeli elections. While Netanyahu does not need Barak’s Labor Party in his coalition, losing it would leave him with a narrow coalition of right wing parties, and severely constrain his ability to maintain a consensus behind his policies.

What this means in terms of the Iranian issue is that the final decision regarding Israeli military action will be taken by Barak and probably by no one else. Certainly, Netanyahu could order a strike, or veto one, but without Barak’s support, he would be forced into a very uncomfortable position. At worst, he would have to remove his defense minister and replace him, thus also losing the Labor Party’s participation in the government at precisely the moment when political unity would be most necessary. For the same reasons, if Barak were to insist upon a strike, or refraining from one, there would be little room for Netanyahu to refuse, even if he wanted to.

This is significant in regard to the latest revelations about the Qom facility because despite Netanyahu and Leiberman’s urgent statements, Barak’s personality and his previous actions suggest that an Israeli strike is highly unlikely, precisely because of the current sense of political urgency. Barak’s is a legendarily mercurial and mathematical mind. One oft-told anecdote is that his favorite method of relaxation is to dismantle watches and put them back together. With one notable exception (the 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon) he tends not to act rashly or emotionally; and plans his moves meticulously beforehand. Along with this, however, he displays a strong affinity for the unexpected stroke. As in the case of the Syrian strike and several surprise evacuations of illegal Israeli settlements, he tends to strike when it is least expected, and to deliberate avoid those moments when action seems inevitable.

Paradoxically, then, the exhortations of Netanyahu and Leiberman, as well as the dramatic revelations of Obama and other Western governments, indicate that IDF action against Iran is decidedly unlikely at this time. Certainly, they can do no harm, and may help build some political support for the strike that is, I think, inevitable. Given who will actually be giving the order, however, they actually make action less likely at this time. That will only happen when the world is busy chattering about other things.